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JOSEPH WEINTRAUB-A JUDGE FOR ALL
SEASONS
John J. Francist
Joseph Weintraub became Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court on August 19, 1957. He brought with him impressive evidence of natural and legal qualifications for that taxing
post: election to Phi Beta Kappa for his undergraduate work at
Cornell University, election to the Order of the Coif at its Law
School where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Cornell Law Quarterly,
and receipt of his law degree with special honors. In addition to an
active trial and appellate court practice, he had been a special
assistant to the state Attorney General in the conduct of important
tax litigation, a New Jersey member of the Waterfront Commission
of the New York Harbor, counsel to Governor Robert B. Meyner,
and at the time of appointment to the New Jersey Supreme Court
he was a judge of the superior court.
As Chief Justice, he was head of the judicial branch of the
government and was possessed of more authority and more duty
than any other chief justice in the country. The New Jersey
constitution made him administrative head of all of the courts of
the state: supreme, superior, county, district, juvenile and domestic
relations, and municipal, now presided over by almost 675 judges.
The designation was not simply a formal one; it was a working
mandate. The New Jersey constitution required him to man the
Appellate, Law, and Chancery Divisions of the New Jersey
Superior Court, and vested him with broad power to transfer
judges from one assignment to another as the need appeared.
It is impossible to describe within the limitations of this Article
the extensive nature of the burden associated with the supervision
of the New Jersey judicial system. Suffice it to say that, although
assisted in the endeavor by an Administrative Director of the
Courts, no day passed in the sixteen years of Chief Justice
Weintraub's service which did not involve him in some discussion,
some action, some correspondence relating to administration as
distinguished from adjudication. Frequently, there were day-long
conferences with assignment judges (presiding judges of single
t Member of the New Jersey Bar. Associate Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court,
1957-72. Judge, New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, 1952-57; Essex County
Court, 1948-52. Advisory Master, Court of Chancery, 1947-48. LL.B. 1925, Rutgers University; LL.M. 1947, New York University; LL.D. 1959, Rutgers University.
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large counties or a group of smaller ones) about operation of the
various courts in their counties and vicinages, and particularly
about the constantly burgeoning trial lists. No judge in the state
was more accessible to court committees engaged in studying
various problems, such as the ever-present concern for improving
rules of civil and criminal practice, or to bar association officers or
committees, or to individual judges or members of the bar with real
or imaginary problems, or to public officials, and, not infrequently,
to ordinary citizens with complaints about judges or the conduct of
courts.
There is no intention to linger on the administrative burdens
of New Jersey's Chief Justice. The purpose of these few comments
is simply to provide a backdrop for an evaluative discussion of
Chief Justice Weintraub as the presiding judge of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey.
Some conception of his capacity can be gained immediately by
a look at the annual reports of the administrative director for the
fifteen years, 1957 through 1972, which detailed the work of all the
courts and of the individual judges for each of those years. The
reports indicate that in spite of his administrative tasks, Chief
Justice Weintraub authored more majority opinions than any other
member of the New Jersey Supreme Court. His efforts were not
confined to the routine cases. Not only did he take his full share of
the cases, but whenever an important public issue was argued on
appeal, and he felt that the public or the other branches of
government would probably expect the court's pronouncement to
come from the Chief Justice, at conference he would say, "I'll take
it," no matter how involved or controversial the problem presented.
All of his opinions were written in longhand, and although his
two law secretaries may have furnished additional research at his
request after the oral argument, no law secretary ever wrote any
part of the ultimate opinion. However, when the draft was circulated for consideration by his colleagues, and then taken up at the
next court conference, he offered no stiff-backed resistance to
suggestions which some of the justices thought might add
clarification, or which might limit the principle espoused to the
needs of the case, especially if that principle represented a change
or revision of a common-law doctrine. But this amenability was
more than matched by a sturdy reluctance to depart from or
qualify the statement of legal principle made necessary in his
judgment by the demands of justice in the case.
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In some jurisdictions cases are assigned for opinion on a
predetermined or rotation system in advance of oral argument.
Chief Justice Weintraub has always opposed such a method. In his
view the tendency of a preassignment system is consciously or
unconsciously to lessen joint responsibility in the court's decisional
process. In a related area, he often expressed the conviction that
cultivation of "expert" judges should be avoided.
Judges bring different experiences to the court. There is a
natural disposition to assign opinions on the basis of interest and
background in particular subjects. That disposition should be
resisted. If, it is not, the work of the court in a given area may
represent the thinking of but one man. More importantly, expertness may breed complacency and hamper rethinking or new
thinking. Every member of a court should be "expert" in all
matters. It calls for more work, but the dividends are rewarding
and in any event the law should be the intelligent product of the
entire court.1
Every judge, he thought, should have the opportunity through the
writing of opinions to demonstrate the full scope of his reasoning
powers and should not be presented to the public as a specialist
lai-gely limited to decision-making in one field of the law.
The New Jersey Supreme Court under Chief Justice Weintraub functioned with an uncomplicated but effective decisional
process. Arguments of appeals were held every other Monday and
Tuesday, with court conferences on those appeals on the intervening Tuesday. After the argument and before the conference, it was
the duty of each justice to consider each case and reach a tentative
conclusion in his own mind as to the proper result. The Chief
Justice had an additional burden, usually discharged on Saturdays
and Sundays. After he had reached tentative conclusions in the
cases, he then decided, again tentatively, upon the justice to whom
the opinion in each case would be assigned, assuming that justice
was in the majority at the conference.
In explaining this process, Chief Justice Weintraub referred to
a number of factors which entered into the tentative selection of
the opinion writer: (1) the workload of each member of the court,
which he said did not merely mean the number of pending cases,
because some cases require more time, (2) the work capacity of
each member of the court, if there were differences due to ill
health or individual capability, and (3) the ability of the particular
justice to hold a majority, if the court were sharply divided. If the
I J.

Weintraub, "Writing, Consideration & Adoption of Opinions," paper delivered at

Conference of Chief Justices, Baltimore, Maryland, Aug. 24, 1960.
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subject called for close careful writing, the individual capacity
might decide the selection. Associated with this selection process
was his effort to achieve an equal division of significant cases, so as
to avoid any injury to an ego.
When the justices assembled for the Tuesday conference, no
one of them knew until the Chief Justice called on him to discuss a
particular case that he would write the opinion if the views he
expressed received the support of the majority. Consequently, each
justice came prepared to discuss each case to be decided. Obviously, this method of operation tended to produce maximum
preparation for conference discussion.
After the justice called upon reviewed the appeal and announced his feelings about the desirable result, Chief Justice Weintraub continued the discussion, suggesting his own views. Each of
his colleagues then set forth his opinion, normally in order of
seniority, until a majority decision was reached. Generally, the
exchange of viewpoints was a keen intellectual exercise; occasionally, as might be imagined, it was not easy to reconcile disparate
opinions of strong-minded men as to the just result or the basis on
which the result should be reached or expressed. When the discussion became heated, Chief Justice Weintraub's talent as a moderator was at its best. If there was a majority for a result but sharply
differing opinions as to the rationale supporting the result, he had
an uncanny knack for blending the arguments into an agreeable
common approach or achieving acceptance of a single basis of
decision by persuading the protagonists of the differing viewpoints
to hold for another day grounds which were not essential to the
result, or if neither course was acceptable, then saving the day by
the alternative means of a concurring opinion.
If the justice first requested to state his conclusions turned out
to hold the minority view, by unwritten rule he was expected, with
rare exceptions, to express that view in a dissenting opinion.
However, when he was joined by other members of the court, it
was understood that they would agree among themselves on the
author of the dissent. A practice requested by Chief Justice Weintraub and agreed upon by his colleagues was that on receipt of the
draft of the majority opinion, the justice charged with the task
would put aside whatever he was working on and write
the dissent or concurrence. Delay in public announcement of the
decision thus was kept to a minimum.
It was understood that the result agreed upon at conference,
even if unanimous, was tentative. If the holder of the opinion
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found, upon closer scrutiny or additional research, that it "would
not write," he was privileged to write the opinion the other way and
circulate it with an explanatory note, or to request that the case be
taken up again at the next conference. On occasion, although not
very frequently, one or the other of these courses was followed
and, perhaps surprisingly, the new view carried the day. If it did
not, the changed conclusion was voiced in a dissent, and Chief
Justice Weintraub chose a new writer for the majority.
In the Usual course, when a majority opinion draft was circulated for review before consideration on the next conference day, it
was expected that each justice would study the draft carefully and
write or telephone the author about any comments or suggestions
for change. Here, the overworked Chief Justice was most helpful.
He would devote himself immediately to the opinion and then walk
into the chambers of the writer, if the justice had adjoining chambers, or write or telephone, and in a most considerate fashion offer
any constructive suggestions or criticisms he had as to form or
substance. He did this without pompousness and without arrogance; he did it modestly but without undue humility. He performed the task as a man devoting himself solely to the achievement of the very essence of justice.
At this point a digression to refer to proceedings at the oral
argument of appeals may be appropriate. The bar of New Jersey
have come to know that the members of the court are prepared for
such arguments. They have read the briefs, the record, if possible,
or pertinent parts of it, and a memorandum reviewing the case by
a law secretary of one of the justices. Consequently, the argument
becomes a dialogue between court and counsel on the crucial
issues, and the attorney who is not steeped in his case or who is
prone to making inaccurate references to the record, quickly finds
himself in deep trouble. When a question was asked and an
unresponsive answer begun, Chief Justice Weintraub, whose mind
had been churning along at jet speed, occasionally said "No, no,
no," and pressed for a direct answer. Some attorneys without much
experience in oral arguments have been heard later to express the
reaction that the Chief Justice's spontaneous remarks were sharp
or disparaging. Nothing could be further from the truth. Persons
aware of his disposition for kindness and compassion know his
rejective comment was instinctive and impersonal and arose from
his complete dedication to the true function of the court. In fact, if
counsel appeared flustered or upset, no one moved in more quickly
or sympathetically to help him out than the Chief Justice.
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Returning to the post-argument court conference, a unique
procedure instituted by the Chief Justice is worthy of mention.
Occasionally, it was necessary to reach a decision in a complicated
or highly technical case, such as a utility rate regulation case, or on
a business or real property tax assessment problem. Even though
experts had testified at the trial or hearing level and the problems
involved were briefed and argued on appeal, sometimes justices
were troubled about their clear comprehension of the technical
aspects of the case. When this difficulty first arose, Chief Justice
Weintraub commented that it was important to remember that
judges are not God, and therefore some further enlightenment
should be sought. His suggestion was that with consent of counsel
the court should sit down informally with them and their experts
and discuss the unclear issues until understanding was reached as
to the theses of the experts and the points of disagreement with
respect to their application in the case-. This course was followed,
perhaps a half dozen times over the years, without objection by
counsel, who left the conference knowing from the open discussion
that the justices now comprehended the issues presented for
decision. It should be said also that although judicial purists of an
earlier period might disapprove of such an unorthodox procedure,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has had no oral or written criticism
of it from the bar. If the Chief Justice were criticized for
sponsoring such an informal explanation of the appeal record,
undoubtedly he would respond as did Chief Justice Taft of the
United States Supreme Court in 1924: "A man who is never
attacked is never useful, and one of the results of a long life's
experience is to minimize the importance of such attacks."2
The views of Chief Justice Weintraub on concurring and
dissenting opinions were well known to his associates. He had said
forcefully that a concurring opinion should not be written merely
to restate the majority view; it should not be written just to pick or
carp at the majority opinion, or to demonstrate a greater writing
facility than its author, or because of personal dislike for him. If
the concurrence did not contribute something of its own, it should
not be written, and even then, in the interest of solidarity, he felt
that an effort should be made to bring the additional view within
the ambit of the majority opinion. He constantly endeavored to
achieve that result, because in his eyes the greatness of a court is
more important than that of an individual.
But the Chief Justice did agree that concurring opinions have
2
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a beneficial place in the operation of appellate courts. If a judge
finds the result just but cannot accept the majority's basis for the
decision, it is entirely fitting that he should express his own views
on the subject. Such a course is preferable to simply saying, "I
concur in the result," which rarely satisfies the trial court or the
bar. Moreover, a proper concurring opinion may have its greatest
value in expressing different and perhaps newer approaches to the
issue in the case for future consideration. In performing that
function it may well be the forerunner of a change in the law, and
it will alert the bar to the possibility that the majority opinion may
not be or should not be the eternal solution of the issue.
In the- day-to-day operations- of a court of last resort the
unanimous opinion is a desirable objective. But as has been said by
some writers, chronic unanimity is inconsistent with man's nature,
especially in these troublesome times when social, economic, and
governmental theories are in a swirl. Throughout his tenure, Chief
Justice Weintraub's view has been that dissenting opinions are
wholesome instruments and not, as some argue, "crabgrass in the
jurisprudential lawn." Chief Justice Hughes described the dissent
in a court of last resort as "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the
law."'3 Chief Justice Weintraub preferred the pragmatic and hopeful spirit of Justice Holmes, who felt that dissent frequently led not
only to a sharpening of the thinking embodied in the majority
opinion and to curtailment of expansive expressions there, but also
to a statement of the law of the future. As Holmes put it:
Law is the business to which my life is devoted, and I should
show less than devotion if I did not do what in me lies to improve
it, and, when I perceive what seems to me the ideal of its future,
if I hesitated
to point it out and to press toward it with all my
heart.4
Chief Justice Weintraub expressed his feelings to- his colleagues in more earthy terms. He would say that no judge should
ever set aside his conviction simply to achieve unanimity; his duty is
to present his views to his brethren at conference, try with all his
might to have them accepted, and, if unsuccessful, to express them
in dissent. He may then rightfully hope that what he has written
will point the way for development of the law of the future.
The Chief Justice espoused the practice, and it was invariably
followed, that a dissent be circulated before the taking of final
action on the majority opinion. This gave the majority writer a
3 M.
4
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chance to tone down the language which may have drawn the ire of
the dissenter, and generally it eliminated the angry dissent.
Moreover, it afforded the majority writer a chance to meet the
discordant view and sometimes brought about withdrawal of the
dissent. Occasionally, when the court was closely divided and both
opinions were laid out for consideration, a well reasoned dissent
carried the day.
There is little a chief justice can do directly about the form of
his colleagues' written opinions. Every man has his own style and
generally he is not very receptive to suggestions which in his view
do not effect substance but do upset the cadence of his opinion.
Assuming a chiefjustice is himself a competent writer, his influence
comes largely from the example he sets, and the persuasiveness of
the views he expresses on the subject of opinion writing. On many
occasions Chief Justice Weintraub suggested a working standard in
practical down-to-earth terms. It was his view-and he followed it
in practice-that from an opinion of a court of last resort the losing
party should know precisely why he lost, the winning party should
know precisely why he won, and, ivhere appropriate, the trial judge
should receive a clear explanation of the nature of his error.
Finally, by clear language, the opinion should educate the bar on
what the governing principle of law will be for the future.
Chief Justice Weintraub was generally opposed to long opinions. He liked a "fair number of short, cryptic sentences [which]
are easy to read and have more punch. '5 However,
[t]here should be a change of pace, for an endless succession of
them would be choppy, but a series of long, complicated sentences is apt to be obscure and surely is wearying. One need but
read the digests in the decennial system to appreciate how
indigestible can be sentences of that character. If the reader must
stop and go over it again, the sentence needs rewriting. And the
long paragraph has a deterrence of its own. It is better to break it
into smaller morsels.
I like little words. They are spry; they dance; they paint
pictures. I would not use a multisyllable word when a four letter
word will do. A succession of ponderous words, usually of latin
derivation, 6lumbers along. They are drab and their weight delays
the reader.
In accord with Sir Francis Bacon, Chief Justice Hughes, and
Justice Holmes, Chief Justice Weintraub did not believe the
judges' function was to write literature. He always has opposed
5 J. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 7.
6 Id. at 7-8.
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cultivation of a facility to side-step responsibility with a rhetorical
phrase. Such a view does not imply that the composition of good
judicial writing necessarily must be different from the composition
of other forms of good writing. It simply means that clear statements of the substantive merits of a case, undecorated by adjectival
flourishes, must have priority over literary style. The Chief Justice
agreed that judges should think "things" and not words, and with
Bacon's caution that there should not be a too
"affectionate study of eloquence," so that men begin "to hunt
more after words than matter, and more after the choiceness of
the phrase, and the round and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and
illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than after the
weight of matter, soundness
of argument, life of invention or
'7
depth of judgment.
It is not within the permissible limits of this subject to illustrate
by a discussion of the form or substance of specific opinions the
manner in which the Chief Justice practiced what he believed and
advocated. But hopefully a few characteristic examples plucked at
random from the many opinions which have left his footprints on
the sands of judicial time may show how much can be said with an
economy of words.
In a damage action holding a broker liable for tortious interference with the prospective pecuniary advantage of a competitor,
a volume was stated in a few words:
The law protects a man in the pursuit of his livelihood.
True, he cannot complain of every disappointment; others too
may further their equal interests, and if the means are fair, the
advantage should remain where success has put it. But if the act
complained of does not rest upon some legitimate interest or if
there is sharp dealing or overreaching or other conduct below
the behavior of fair men similarly situated, the ensuing loss
should be rcdresscd.8
On another occasion he revealed this unique capacity in disposing of a constitutional contention in terms easily understood by
the ordinary citizen. A defendant in a homicide case who had been
given all the Miranda warnings said that his confession was involuntary because he did not realize its inculpatory nature. Consider the
answer:
There is no right to escape detection. There is no right to
commit a perfect crime or to an equal opportunity to that end.
C.D. BOWEN, FRANCIS BACON, THE TEMPER OF A MAN 10 (1963).
8 Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 461, 197 A.2d 359, 363 (1964).
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The Constitution is not at all offended when a guilty man stubs
his toe. On the contrary, it is decent to hope that he will. Nor is it
dirty business to use evidence a defendant himself may furnish in
the detectional stage. Voluntary confessions accord with high
moral values, and as to the culprit who reveals his guilt unwittingly with no intent to shed his inner burden, it is no more
unfair to use the evidence he thereby reveals than it is to turn
against him clues at the scene of the crime which a brighter,
better informed, or more gifted criminal would not have left.
Thus the Fifth Amendment does not say that a man shall not
be permitted to incriminate himself, or that he shall not be
persuaded to do so. It says no more than that a man shall not be
"compelled" to give evidence against himself. 9

Consider also this example rejecting an abstruse defense of
lack of mental capacity in a murder case. A medical witness who
described himself as a psychodynamically-oriented psychiatrist in
substance stated that there is no free will; man is a helpless victim
of his genes and his lifelong environment, and that unconscious
forces from within dictate his behavior without his being able to
alter it. So, when the accused killed, it was an automatic reaction
motivated by the predetermined and predestined influence of his
unconscious.
In holding that a world of reality cannot accept such a thesis as
a defense, the Chief Justice wrote:
Abstractly, the cause-and-effect thesis could suggest a stul-

tifying determinism whereunder every stroke of man's pen was
ordained when time first stirred. But the psychiatrist, awed by it
all, wisely leaves that subject to the philosopher. Besides it is not
easy for an inquiring mind to believe it is on a string stretching
from infinity. Nonetheless the cause-and-effect thesis dominates
the psychiatrist's view of his patient. He traces a man's every
deed to some cause truly beyond the actor's own making, and
says that although the man was aware of his action, he was
unaware of the assembled forces in his unconscious which decided his course. Thus the conscious is a puppet, and the unconscious the puppeteer. 10
Chief Justice Weintraub is worthy of this issue of the Cornell
Law Review commemorating his retirement, and those of us who
have joined in the event are honored to participate. It is not easy
for a person who has enjoyed his friendship and association as a
bench colleague for fifteen years, and who has a weakness for
adjectives, to write about one of the truly great judges of our time
9 State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 53, 243 A.2d 241, 250 (1968).
10 State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 475-76, 210 A.2d 193, 205 (1965).
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without embarrassing him. But the light of his record will not dim;
it will point the way for future generations of judges in their search
for truth and justice. He leaves the bench with his spiritual and
mental arteries as youthful as when he donned the robe. His
colleagues will remember him as the complete judge, one who has
earned distinction as a judge for all seasons.

